Firms' tax planning decisions, similar to their other operational decisions, are made in a competitive environment. Various stakeholders observe the tax payments and evaluate these against the relevant peer group, which creates interdependencies in the tax planning activities of firms. Introducing the concept of reputational loss we show the positive interdependence in a theoretical model and test it in a spatial econometric model. Empirical evidence suggest that benchmarking takes place both within countries and within industries, however the latter is mainly important in non-EU OECD countries. Further the analysis shows that spatial interdependence is stronger for the largest firms and if they have an average effective tax rate above the statutory tax rate.
Introduction
One of the perpetuating forces of tax competition is based on the desire of (multinational) firms to reduce the burden of taxation on profits. This force is not only responsible for shifts of capital across borders, but also motivates the multitude of strategies that firms adopt to lower their effective tax rate (ET R). 1 However, despite the widespread belief that extensive tax planning takes place, there is rather little research concerned with the underlying determinants. Further, firms' tax planning decisions, similar to their other operational decisions, are made in a competitive environment.
Various stakeholders of the firm can observe tax payments and evaluate these against the relevant peer group, which creates interdependencies in the tax planning activities of firms.
In this paper we aim to capture this influence in a theoretical model which introduces a reputational loss. Managers have to balance the benefits of a reduced tax burden against the costs of a loss in reputation if they deviate too much from the behaviour of their peer group. This is neatly summed up in the introduction of the tax benchmarking studies done by the international accountancy firm PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2009) stating 'a current challenge for the tax professional is to identify the right balance when planning for taxes.
On the one side of the balance, taxes are a significant cost to the corporation and should be controlled and managed in the quest to create shareholder value and maximise earnings per share. On the other side, the amount of tax paid by large corporations is coming under increasing scrutiny and stirring public debate.'
This statement already highlights some of the complexity of this benchmarking process. In consequence we see the concept of the reputational loss as a multi-facetted phenomenon, as various shareholders pursue conflicting interests. Shareholders are likely to prefer a low ET R, analyst might be concerned with sustainability of the ET R while the tax authorities and critical consumers want to see the corporation to pay its 'fair share' of income taxes.
However, all of these stakeholders have only limited information about the firms true situation. Therefore they evaluate the observable tax payments relative to the peer group. This leads to a yardstick-like form of competition where managers anticipate their competitors moves and optimise their own behaviour. This in turn creates a positive interdependence in the choice of tax sheltering, which we can test empirically.
Using a spatial econometric approach we find evidence for interdependence in the ET R. Our results confirm the existence of spatial interdependence between firms in the same country and between firms in the same industry. However, in the latter case, positive reaction functions are only found for developed countries. Further, we find a stronger interdependence for firm, which had an ET R above the average of their peer group.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the strands of literature we build our analysis on. Section 3 provides a small theoretical model showing the spatial dependence, which is empirically tested in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
Previous literature
Income taxes and the avoidance thereof have been in the focus of the academic discussion for some time. Hence a lot of the features we include in our model can be found in some form in earlier literature. In consequence this section aims only to summarize the most important strands of literature rather than providing a complete review of the related literature.
The earlier contributions deal with evasion of personal income tax and build on the economic analysis of crime of Becker (1968) . 2 In a seminal article Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model the decision how much taxes to evade as a function of the probability of being audited and penalized. Reinganum and Wilde (1985) analyse the auditing decisions of the tax authorities in a principal agent framework and introduce the idea that the auditing probability depends on the reported income. Although not explicitly modelled, the idea of an 'audit cutoff' implies some evaluation against the other tax payers. In a different context Shleifer (1985) introduces the concept of yardstick competition, which models the use of peer group comparison to infer about the true situation of the firms. Translating these two idea into our model, we assume that the tax authorities compare the reported income of companies with the relevant peer group in order to decide which firms will come under scrutiny. For example in the United Kingdom, the tax authorities are introducing a risk rating for the biggest corporation based on a combination of organisiational features and past tax behaviour. Freedman et al. (2008) for an discussion of this risk rating. Levenson (1999, p. 16) Abarbanell and Bushee (1998) and Swenson (1999) expect that lower ET R send positive signals to the stock market.
More recent contribution, mostly by economists, find mixed evidence for a negative relationship between ET R and stock market valuation. For example, Desai and Hines (2002) analyse corporate inversions, where the headquarter is relocated to a tax haven. They find that in the longer run, these aggressive tax planning activities lead to a reduced stock price. The subsequent discussion of Slemrod (2004) concludes that corporate tax planning needs to be analysed in a larger framework including the shareholders. Crocker and Slemrod (2005) and Chen and Chu (2005) provide formal theoretical principal-agent models of corporate income tax evasion with agency costs. Dharmapala (2006a, 2006b) find evidence for this model of tax sheltering and managerial diversion. They conclude that increased corporate tax sheltering increases the firm value only in combination with good corporate governance. Otherwise the increased opportunities for diversion of profits dominate the tax saving effect. 4 A different strand of literature aims to explain the tax paying behaviour of corporations. The earliest contributions can be found in the accounting literature. 5 Firm size is identified as an important determinant, as large firms have more resources to optimize their tax planning, which would imply a lower ET R. At the same time large corporations are expected to be audited more often, creating higher political costs of tax planning for larger firms. 6 Subsequently, more determinants of the ET R were introduced into the analysis. Wilkie (1988) discusses the importance of the profitability, Gupta and Newberry (1997) find that the asset mix and leverage matters, which is confirmed by Mills, Erickson, and Maydew (1998) . Further Leblang (1998) argues that firms with more multinational activity have more tax planning opportunities. 7 More recently, Graham and Tucker (2006) analyse 44 tax sheltering cases and identify firm size and profitability as determinants of firms which are using tax sheltering.
4 For further evidence for this hypothesis see and Desai and Dharmapala (2007) .
5 See Rego (2003) for a summary and discussion of this literature. 6 See Zimmerman (1983) and Omer, Molloy, and Ziebart (1993) for a discussion and early evidence for the political cost hypothesis.
7 Collins and Shackelford (1999) find only inconclusive evidence for this hypothesis.
Finally, a small number of authors have addressed the impact of the society on tax paying behaviour. Posner (2000) discusses the impact of social norms on income tax compliance, and Weisbach (2002) considers this idea for corporate tax compliance as well. However, he dismisses the idea that social norms are able to explain the absence of more tax avoidance and concludes with a 'undersheltering puzzle'. In contrast, we argue in this paper that social norms, or more generally pressure from the wider public, add into the reputational loss and mitigate the benefits from tax sheltering. For example the newspaper 'The Guardian' run an investigation into the tax payments of the FTSE 100 companies and commented on the ET R of the biggest companies. 8
Theoretical model
Consider to a world with two firms, denoted with the subscripts i and j. Each firm has a potential gross profit of π i . Of this profit the manager can shelter the fraction θ i from corporate taxes t. However, tax planning involves two types of costs. First there are the cost of tax planning itself C and secondly there is a reputational loss of L depending on its own tax planning activities relative to the one of its competitors. The net profit Π i of firm i is therefore
where ∆θ ij = θ i − θ j and i = j.
We assume that the tax sheltering costs C are increasing and convex in θ i . In order to provide an analytical solution to the model we choose a simple functional form with the necessary properties. More specifically we set
Further the firm incurs a reputational loss depending on the own tax planning in comparison to the competitors tax planning. Again, we assume that the reputational loss is increasing and convex in the absolute difference between θ i and θ j and use the simple functional form of
Each firm chooses its fraction of tax sheltering in order to maximise their after tax profit. Inserting (2) and (3) in (1) and partially deriving with respect to θ i yields
The first term represents the marginal tax savings and the second term the marginal costs of sheltering more profits from taxation. Optimally θ i is chosen so that these to terms equal. Solving for the optimal θ i yields
Note that this reaction function only holds if 3t/3(α + β) = 0. For t = 0 the reaction function collapses to θ i = βθ j /(α + β) which implies an equilibrium at
Proposition 1: There is a positive interdependence in the tax sheltering behaviour of firms.
Proof: Deriving the first order condition in 4 with respect to θ i and θ j yields
which can be simplified to
This expression is unambiguously positive for if θ i ≥ θ j . For θ i < θ j this term will only be negative if either the denominator or the numerator, but not both are negative. The numerator will be negative if the following condition is met
The first part on this expression implies that all values of t < 0.5 would demand, irrespective of the competitors behaviour, more than 100 percent of tax sheltering for the numerator to become negative.
Further, rearranging (7) to
it can be shown that the denominator is smaller than the numerator if
which can not be fulfilled if θ j needs to be larger than θ i . In consequence the denominator is larger than the numerator which in turn can only be negative for unrealistically high tax rates.
Proposition 2: With a higher corporate tax rate firm shelter a bigger fraction of profits against taxation.
Proof: The partial derivative of (5) with respect to t captures the direct effect of a change in the tax rate, which is given through
This expression is unambiguously positive, as the denominator is positive and absolutely larger than the negative numerator. This ensures that the value of the fraction is negative, but smaller than unity which ensures that the term in the brackets positive. This implies that each firm ceteris paribus increases it tax sheltering activity in response to an increase of the tax rate. Proposition 1 further states a positive response to an increase of the other firms tax sheltering activities. Hence this tax effect is intensified and unambiguously positive.
Proposition 3: Firms with higher the profits shelter a bigger fraction of profits against taxation.
Proof: Deriving (5) with respect to the π i yields
. (12) which is unambiguously positive. Therefore, all else equal, firms with larger profits shelter a bigger fraction against corporate taxes.
Under the assumption of identical cost functions for both firms, equivalent reaction functions for firm j can be derived. Parameterizing the model, 4 Empirical Analysis
Data
Most of the stakeholders described in the theoretical model above, have only access to publicly available data. This suggests that the correct dataset should be the published annual accounts, since it is these accounts that shareholders and analysts or the wider public will use to benchmark the company's performance. And in anticipating this, it is this ET R measure which the managers set at the optimal level. The tax authorities do have further information about how much the firms actually paid in their country, however, if they wish to compare the tax behaviour of multinational companies in other countries, they are also restricted to publicly available data. We, therefore, use accounting data for our empirical analysis. More specifically, we use the largest available dataset of firm-level accounts, ORBIS, provided by Bureau van Dijk. As the concept of a reputational loss is more applicable to large corporations, we restrict our dataset to consolidated accounts. On top of that we restrict our sample to the largest 500 companies in each country. 10 The reflects the fact that most stakeholders focus their attention on the biggest companies, rather than on small and medium sized firms.
ORBIS usually provides a time window of the latest ten years. In order to overcome this restriction, we combine an earlier download from the October 2006 version with a download from the current version as in December 2008.
In consequence we have a time window from 1993 to 2008, with a partly overlapping sample. In total we download 50,102 firms from the old version and 48,330 partly overlapping firms from the current version.
We define our dependent variable ET R as the ratio of the tax as reported in the account and the pre tax profit. This implies that the variable will be undefined in case the pre tax profit is zero. Further, in the case of a loss, this ratio can be misleading. We therefore exclude all observations with a misleading outcome and set the ET R to zero, where it is undefined because of zero pre tax profit. Figure 2 summarizes this procedure.
Alternatively one could exclude all loss making companies on the grounds that they face a different optimisation problem. However this would increase the truncation of the dataset even more.
10 We use the 500 firms with the largest average total assets over the whole period of observation. To increase the balancedness of our sample we restrict our sample to 500 companies after the cleaning process described below.
Valid. Eliminated.
ET R undefined. T AX = 0 ET R = 0.
ET R set to 0.
Valid. Eliminated. We also include the following control variables from ORBIS. Firm size (SIZE) is measured as the logarithm of total assets. Profitability is measured through the return on assets (ROA), defined as earnings before interest divided through total assets. Potential interest deductibility is captured by leverage (DEBT ), which we measure as the sum of current and noncurrent liabilities as a share of total assets. 11 We also control for capital intensity (CAP IN T ), defined as the share of tangible fixed assets in total assets, and intangibles assets (IN T AN G), defined as the share of intangible assets in total assets.
In order to avoid problems because of outliers we drop the top and bottom percentile of all variables. 12 We then use only those firms for which we have at least 4 contiguous observations on each firm, and at least ten firms per country. This leaves as with a sample of 73,784 observations in 10,031 firms, with a country coverage as described in Table 1 .
As the distinction into geographical regions in Table 1 already suggests, the spectrum of countries in our sample is very broad and it is likely to be misleading if we include all firms in the same regressions. We therefore split our sample according to this geographical breakdown. This also implies that we think that firms do not compare themselves -nor are they compared to each other by various stakeholders -to firms in completely different geographical regions. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the various geographical groups.
11 We include current liabilities, as the split between current and noncurrent liabilities appears to be varying across countries. See also Huizinga, Laeven and Nicodeme (2008) for a similar approach.
12 With the exception of SIZE, where we only drop the smallest observations. We also eliminate all observations with a leverage bigger than unity. A complete description of the cleaning process is available from the authors upon request. In terms of other characteristic, the firms in the developed countries are larger on average, which is mostly due to the fact that the restriction to the 13 We will use the term developed countries as a label for the combined sample of OECD and non-OECD EU countries. 
Empirical strategy
To test for the existence of spatial interdependence we specify a spatial autoregressive (SAR) model that can estimate the relationship between an individual firm's ET R and that of its competitors. In equation (13) the individual firm's ET R i,t is a function of its competitors' ET Rs.
Competitors' ET Rs are contained in i =j ω c ij,t ET R j,t and ω c i,j,t selects the appropriate competitors for each firm i in each period t from the vector of all firms' ET Rs (ET R j,t ). The set of competitors c varies by year and across firms (we discuss the selection of competitors later). This matrix is often referred to in the literature as the 'weighting' or 'connectivity' matrix.
It will have a positive value if the current firm is related to another, and zero otherwise. The size of the positive value will reflect the strength of the relationship between the firms. This allows us to specify a relationship between the current firm's ET R and competitors' ET Rs. The estimate of the parameter ρ will tell us the sign, size and significance of competitors' ET Rs in determining the firm's ET R. We also include a set of firm-level control variables X i,t consistent with the literature discussed in Section 2, the statutory corporate tax rate τ k,t in country k, along with a set of firm fixed effects µ i .
Specifying the weighting matrix:
In this study, we would like to choose the competitor firms which represent the most likely benchmark set of firms that shareholders will use. This requires some judgement as there is no obvious best way to choose competitors. For this reason, we specify a number of alternative weighting matrices which we can trial.
The weights in the weighting matrix are designed to select the most important competitors for each firm. To this end we define a dummy variable δ c ij which take the value one if the competitor is in the same reference group c and zero otherwise. Specifically we use three different set of reference groups, all 14 Descriptive statistics for the unrestricted sample are available from the authors upon request.
firms in the same country, all firms in the same NACE 2-digit industry and all firms in the same industry within same country. Further, we think it is unrealistic that companies are compared or are comparing themselves to hundreds of competitors. Therefore we also include a dummy κ c ij,t which is set equal to unity if the competitor is similar in size. Namely we allow the 20 companies closest in size to have a positive weight in the weighting matrix. We finally allocate each competitor a specific weight, which is defined as a quadratic inverse distance between the size of the current firm and the competitor in question. The inverse distance measure ensures that similarly sized firms get greatest weight and the quadratic form allows firms to be similar in size if they are larger or smaller than the current firm. Formally, the weights are defined as
We further normalise the weights to sum to unity. 15
Econometric issues
Estimation of equation (13) using OLS will yield biased and inconsistent estimates of α because the weighted competitors' ET Rs will be correlated with each firm's error term ε it . Correcting for this spatial endogeneity problem has been approached in a number of ways. 16 We follow a standard approach as proposed by Kelejian and Robinson (1993) and Kelejian and Prucha (1998) 17 and use a 2 stage least squares procedure in which spatially lagged explanatory variables are used to instrument for the spatially lagged dependent variables.
A further issue arising with our empirical specification is that some of the control variables are endogenous. This is most obvious for our measure of the profitability (ROA) as a measure of the pre tax profit is used in both the dependent and independent variable. We therefore also instrument for profitability (ROA) using the market power of the company and the industry concentration.
For the market power we use market share and market share squared, where market share is defined as the operating revenues of the companies in the year t as a fraction of the sum of operating revenues of all firms within the same country in the year t. For industry concentration we use the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index, defined as the sum of the squared market shares within country and Anselin et al. (2008) . 18 See Cowling and Waterson (1976) or Machin and Van Reenen (1993) for evidence on the connection between market share, industry concentration and profitability.
Results
Following the definition of δ c ij we use Equation (14) to construct three weighting matrices. First, we include all firms that operate in the same industry. This captures the idea, that firms are evaluated against similar companies across borders, which is in line with the benchmarking studies PWC is conducting.
Secondly we include all firms in the weighting matrix with their domicile in the same country. Our rationale for this weighting matrix is that, competition may take place among, for example, FTSE 100 companies irrespective of their industry. And finally we only include all companies within the same industry and country.
We therefore run the regression as specified in equation (13) Similarly there are significant coefficients for the country-industry weighted competitors ET Rs for the Asian and for the tax haven subsample, again, with the caveat of weak instruments. In this case, the weak instruments are due to the fact that the set of competitors becomes to small and is non-negligibly influenced by individual outliers. Profitability, measured through the return on assets (ROA i,t ) exhibits the expected significantly negative sign for the OECD and the Asian subsample. Given that the ROA i,t is also instrumented, namely through market share of the firms and the industry concentration, the same caveats concerning the quality of instruments apply.
The firm size turns out significant for most specifications. Interestingly Table 3 Notes: All regressions include firm-level fixed effects. Standard error in brackets. ** significant at the 1 percent level, * significant at the 5 percent level. Estimated using the GMM option of the xtivreg2 stata procedure, provided by Schaffer (2007) . F-statistic first stage refers to the Stock and Yogo (2005) weak identification test statistics.
enough, larger firms appear to have a lower ET R in the developed countries while they seem to have a higher ET R in Asian, other emerging or tax haven countries. Linking this back to the literature suggests that the political costs hypothesis is more applicable for emerging markets. In developed countries large companies appear to be able to use their size for better tax planning. The leverage of firms exhibits a significantly positive coefficient for all specifications, which is counterintuitive at first sight. A possible explanation is the inclusion of firm specific fixed effects. This implies that the coefficients describe the effect of changes rather than in levels. Therefore one could interpret the positive coefficients in the way that firms with increasing ET Rs and low initial debt levels, increase their debt share to benefit from more deductible interests in the future. Similarly, in the developed countries the the share of intangibles (IN T AN G i,t ) bears a significantly positive sign, which could mirror changes in firm behaviour, e.g. increasingly using intangible assets to facilitate profit shifting in the future in combination with a currently increasing tax burden.
In most specification the coefficient for the statutory corporate tax rate (τ k,t ) in the headquarter country is positive and significant. At first sight this is in contradiction with proposition 2 which stipulates an increase in tax sheltering in reaction of a higher statutory tax rate. However, the inclusion of firm specific fixed effects implies that the coefficient of τ k,t describes the effect of a change in the statutory tax rate on the effective tax rate. Abstracting from changes in the corporate tax base, this would hint at a coefficient of one. 21 Coefficients significantly lower than unity points have two likely explanations. First, the tax rate cut (increase) has been accompanied by a tax base broadening (narrowing). Secondly, this could also be indirect evidence of tax sheltering activities insofar as companies decide to include a greater (smaller) proportion of their profits in the taxable profits as a reaction to reduced (increased) statutory tax rates. Therefore, the positive coefficient, significantly lower than unity, is consistent with the predictions in proposition 2.
Allowing for asymmetric reactions to competitors: We stress the multifaceted nature of the concept of a reputational loss. It is therefore likely that managers do not follow competitors' ET Rs upwards and downwards in the same measure. In fact, the specification of the theoretical model even suggests a stronger downward adjustment for firms with ET Rs above their peer, as the tax saving effect and the reduction of the reputational loss work in the same direction then. Therefore, we want to investigate the possibility of asymmetric responses to the benchmark ET R. Given that the relative tax position of a firm, i.e. whether its ET R is higher or lower than the average of the relevant peer group, is the result of the spatial interdependence so far, this distinction is endogenous and can not be used to estimate asymmetric reaction functions. To avoid this problem, we use the statutory corporate tax rate as the threshold value. Intuitively, this seems to be an critical value, as it appears to be difficult for anyone to argue that a firm is not paying its fair share of taxes if it has a ET R equal or higher than the statutory tax rate.
Following the line of argument above we would expect a larger coefficient for the competitors ET R if the firm itself has an ET R higher than the statutory tax rate. The table is organized as follows. In each subsample the first two columns represent the regression with firms that exhibit a ET R lower than the statutory corporate tax rate. The third and fourth column then present the same results for the firms with a higher ET R.
Starting with the first two and the fifth and sixth columns one can clearly see, that the positive reaction to the competitors ET R is not evident if the firm itself has an ET R lower than the corporate tax rate. Somewhat surprisingly the coefficient is even significantly negative for industry-weighted competitors tax rates in the EU. This is a quite strong result, given that the firms with an ET R below the statutory tax rate are the rule rather than the exception. A possible explanation are the weak instruments, as indicated by the low first stage F-statistics. Further the sign for the profitability turns to significantly positive which suggests that the first stage regression is potentially dominated by large negative outliers, i.e. loss making companies. 23 Comparing the third and the fourth column in Table 4 with the first two columns in Table 3 one can see that the reaction to the competitors ET R is stronger for the firms with a high ET R themselves. In line with the baseline results the coefficient for the ET R of competitors in the same country is higher and the test statistics are more convincing. This is even more pronounced for 
Competitors ET R Notes: All regressions include firm-level fixed effects. Standard error in brackets. ** significant at the 1 percent level, * significant at the 5 percent level. Estimated using the GMM option of the xtivreg2 stata procedure, provided by Schaffer (2007) . F-statistic first stage refers to the Stock and Yogo (2005) weak identification test statistics.
the subsample of EU firms, where the industry-weighted ET Rs still fail to have a significant impact.
Again, there is a significant difference between the non-OECD Asian subsample and the two subsamples containing firms in developed countries.
While only about 60 percent of the observations in the OECD or the EU sample have an ET R lower than the statutory tax rates, this holds true for more than three quarters of the observations in the non-OECD Asian subsample. The direct consequence is that we have few observations to estimate the reaction functions for those firms with a higher tax rates. In fact, the very low first stage F-statistics in the last two columns indicate that our instruments are very weak. Hence the insignificant estimates for these regressions are little surprising. Nevertheless, the exclusion of these observations in the two other regressions for the non-OECD Asian subsample causes the coefficients for competitors ET R to drop significantly. This is again consistent with the idea, that firms with above average ET Rs react stronger to their peer group ET Rs.
Stronger interaction between bigger companies: We think that the concept of a reputational loss, as we want to define it in this paper, is more applicable to large corporations. There are a number of reasons for this. For instance, corporations small enough not to be included in the leading stock indices of their country are more likely to fall under the radar of critical assessment. This hold in particular true for campaigns by NGOs fighting against tax evasion/avoidance, but also for the scrutiny of tax authorities where the natural starting place for auditing is also the pre-defined list of the biggest corporations (e.g. FTSE 100 in the United Kingdom, or the DAX in Germany). To test, whether the interaction in the tax behaviour between these particularly publicly exposed firms is stronger, we rerun the regressions with only the top 200 companies per country included. Table 5 displays the result for the developed country, i.e. the OECD and the EU subsample. 24 Comparing the results with the baseline results in Table 3 one can see that the coefficients for the competitors ET R are somewhat larger and highly significant. The test statistics for the instruments are also improved, indicating that the model is correctly specified. Consistent with all the previous results there is no evidence for an influence of the industry weighted competitors ET R in the European subsample. Combined with a robustly significant coefficient in the OECD subsample one can conclude that the benchmarking 24 Again the results for the other subsamples are suppressed because of space considerations and available from the authors upon request. within the same industry mainly takes place in non-EU OECD countries.
Conclusion
In this paper we argue that firms' tax planning decisions are made in a competitive environment. Shareholders with various and partly competing objectives observe tax payments and evaluate these against the relevant peer group. Deviation from the behaviour of comparable firms triggers some sort of reputational loss. Firms anticipates this benchmarking and incorporate the consequences into their tax planning strategy which creates interdependencies in the ET Rs of firms.
We aim to capture this influence in a theoretical model which introduces a reputational loss. We see the concept of the reputational loss as a multifacetted phenomenon, as various shareholders pursue conflicting interests. In consequence, managers have to balance the benefits of a reduced tax burden against the costs of a loss in reputation if they deviate too much from the behaviour of their peer group. Anticipating this benchmarking, managers incorporate their peer groups tax planning into their own decision process.
This in turn creates a positive interdependence, which we can test empirically.
Using a spatial econometric approach we find evidence for interdependence in the ET R. In general, the positive spatial interdependence between the ET Rs of firms is strongest between the largest firms in the same country. This evidence holds by and large for companies in the OECD, in the European Union and in Asian countries. The strategic interaction within the same industry, however, is mainly driven by non-EU OECD countries. In developed countries we further show a stronger interdependence for firms having an ET R above the statutory corporate tax rate.
